

Gaithersburg Rotary Club

14 February 1967

Washington, D.C.

I. Introduction

A. Preliminaries

B. Preview

1. Talk about why CIA exists -- background
2. Function in National Security structure
3. Relation to policy making
4. The "Invisible Government" aspects

C. Will leave time for questions

II. Development of CIA

A. Nature of intelligence before WWII

1. Military -- Departmental
2. Political -- By-product of FSO system in State

B. Lessons of WWII

1. Need for coordination mechanism -- Pearl Harbor
2. Need for "total" intelligence coverage -- Blunders

C. Decision to create new mechanism

1. To coordinate all U. S. Intelligence activities
2. To produce non-departmental intelligence
3. To have no departmental interest
 - a. Danger of self-serving estimate
 - b. Danger of policy setting

Transition: Now the question: Does CIA set policy?

III. Agency Relation to Policy

A. Recent Fulbright controversy (For. Aff. Committee)

1. The Dean Rusk statement
2. Decision and result

B. The non-policy concept

1. Intelligence only one factor in policy
2. Provides major background instrument
 - a. The National Intelligence Estimate
 - b. Product of entire intelligence community
 - c. Provision for dissent

C. The policy implication situation

1. The estimate of a consequence -- Cuba 1962
2. Alternative courses of action

Transition: Another area ^{of} controversy -- Accountability

IV. The Invisible Government

A. Presidential oversight

1. The President and the National Security Council
2. The 303 Committee (Vance, Kohler, Rostow, DCI)
3. The Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clark Clifford)

B. Legislative oversight

1. The Senate subcommittees

a. Armed Service -- Russell of Georgia (5 members)

b. Appropriations -- Mahon of Texas (4 members)

2. The House subcommittees

a. Armed Services -- Rivers of South Carolina (11 members)

b. Appropriations -- Hayden of Arizona (4 members)

C. Fiscal oversight -- Burial of funds and DCI authority

1. The Bureau of the Budget

2. Internal audit procedures and BOB audit

V. Conclusion

A. Evaluation of the Agency effort

1. What happens is not a valid standard

2. Defense or justification dangerous

3. Constant internal evaluation

B. New concept of intelligence

1. Weapons system -- a deterrent force

2. Ultimately a preventive -- the Chinese War Lords